| 1. | The second chapter did research on currency recompense incentives
第二章对货币报酬激励进行了研究。 |
| 2. | Pay in currency is an important component of clerk ' s whole pay
摘要货币报酬是员工整体薪酬的重要组成部分。 |
| 3. | The thesis divided the contract into fix contract and changeable contract
本文将影响经营者货币报酬的合同分为固定合同和可变合同。 |
| 4. | Pay in currency usually is made up of basic pay , bonus and well - beings pay
货币报酬一般可视为由基本工资、奖金、福利工资三部分构成。 |
| 5. | In default of monetary incentives and promotion incentives , it ' s very important to intensify the construction of organizational culture
在货币报酬激励和职务晋升报酬激励缺失的条件下，加强组织文化建设意义重大。 |
| 6. | We began from the contract of currency recompense . the different kind of contract made different effect on manager behavior
本文的研究从规定经营者货币报酬的合同开始，货币报酬合同的不同形式对经营者的行为将产生不同的影响。 |
| 7. | The writing attempts to make an analysis of the differences and causes on the basis of the investigation of the receipts of pay in currency for personnel in different positions in our country
本文通过调查不同岗位人员货币报酬有关数据并结合我国实际情况，浅析这其中的差异及原因。 |
| 8. | Indeed , another side of happiness economics busies itself studying the non - monetary rewards from work : most people enjoy parts of their work , and some people love it
确实，幸福经济学另一方面正忙于研究工作所带来的非货币报酬：绝大多数人享受着部分他们的工作，一些人达到了热爱的程度。 |
| 9. | The changeable contract is the contract regulating the manager ' s income is fluctuant with the achievement . in our country , state - owned enterprises are trying to make a contract combine the income with the achievement . these contract
可变合同是指合同规定经营者的货币报酬可以随经营业绩的好坏而变动的合同，我国国有企业正在尝试的将经营者报酬与他的业绩挂钩的合同就属于这类合同。 |
| 10. | Executive compensation has attracted much attention from domestic economists yet no same conclusions are drawn . while making theoretical analysis and model studying , we provide empirical evidence on relation of executive pay - performance using data on china listed companies from 1998 to 2004 . main conclusions are : that executive monetary compensation increase at much larger rapidity than that of firm performance improvement ; that management tend to improve performance measures closely related to their private income and ignore firm ’ s long - term development ; that keeping authority stable may help improve performance and alter of authority has a negative effect , but chairman of the board and ceo ’ s inner promotion or deployment from outside may impose influence in different direction and extent
本文在理论探讨和模型分析的基础上,对我国上市公司1998 - 2004年度管理层激励与经营绩效关系进行实证研究,得到的主要结论是:上市公司管理层货币报酬的增长幅度远远大于经营绩效提高的幅度;管理层偏向于提高与自身收入密切相关的绩效指标,而忽略公司的长期和全面发展;保持控制权稳定有助于改善经营绩效,控制权的变更总体上会导致经营绩效的下降,但是董事长和总经理由内部晋升和从外部调入对经营绩效会产生不同方向和程度的影响。 |
