| 1. | The ownership of enterprise property : state ' s , person ' s or others
对企业所有权与经营权分离论的再梳理 |
| 2. | This division is common to many enterprises all over the world , especially to some big companies , not special in our enterprises
所有权与经营权分离并不是我国国有企业所特有的，而是全世界许多企业，特别是大企业普遍存在的。 |
| 3. | The biggest character of modern enterprises is separation of ownership and manager rights , and the relation of owners and managers is agent
现代公司制企业最大的特点是所有权与经营权分离，所有者与经营者之间是一种委托代理关系。 |
| 4. | Trust - type investment fund in securities is a typical system that separates ownership from managing rights , in which existing high risk of trustees " morality
信托制证券投资基金是典型的所有权与经营权分离的制度，存在突出的代理人道德风险问题。 |
| 5. | The company governs is the property rights and the right of management separates , the owner but produces not the request agent which identically relates with operator ' s benefit
摘要公司治理就是所有权与经营权分离,所有者与经营者的利益不一致而产生的委托代理关系。 |
| 6. | Many domestic and foreign academicians have made a large number of definitions for the family enterprise . on this part , i list out some typical definitions ,
然后,阐述家族企业发展的三个阶段:人治管理阶段,人治管理向制度化管理转变阶段以及企业所有权与经营权分离阶段。 |
| 7. | [ abstract ] the company governs is the property rights and the right of management separates , the owner but produces not the request agent which identically relates with operator ' s benefit
摘要公司治理就是所有权与经营权分离,所有者与经营者的利益不一致而产生的委托代理关系。 |
| 8. | The separate phenomenon of the rights of ownership and management has taken place , and the control of joint - stock company has converted from the shareholders to the managing organ
于是，所有权与经营权分离就成为逻辑的归结。股份公司也由传统的股东控制，转变为由经营者控制，与此同时，所有者已经不足以监督日益膨胀的经营机关。 |
| 9. | Executive stock option ( eso ) , existing in the cases of the owner separated from the manager in modern enterprises , is a salary rule which impel managers and employees to work hard for the long period development of company
股票期权激励制度，是现代企业中所有权与经营权分离的情况下激励经营者及员工为公司长期发展努力工作的一种薪酬制度。 |
| 10. | Therefore , the division does n ' t reflect the system limitation of enterprises . the efficiency of enterprises is mainly decided by the construct of enterprise trust - agency , in other word , how the owners inspire the managers
因此，所有权与经营权分离并不反映企业的制度缺陷，企业的效率主要决定于企业委托一代理关系的设计，即所有者如何激励经营者。 |
